3
considerations that move Schelling. Fichte aims to explain the concept not of philosophy but of the Wissenschaftslehre, and considers the bare notion of philosophy on which Schelling dwells, settled and unproblematic: the question which launches philosophical reflection is simply that of the possibility of ordinary first-order human knowledge of the basic empirical kind that also provides Kant's starting point. In Fichte's terms, the 'form of all philosophy' is simply whatever form renders natural consciousness self-transparent, and there is nothing at the level of total abstraction where Schelling wants to operate, that could provide a purchase for philosophical thought. The contrast sharpens when Schelling says that it cannot be assumed at the outset that philosophical knowledge is foundational for knowledge as such. 7 The required argument is in fact extremely simple, and is completed in a couple of sentences, but the vital point is that, for Schelling, philosophical knowledge is strictly autonomous in relation to worldly cognition, not answerable to empirical consciousness. Each may therefore be said to take their initial stand in natural consciousness, but in different sectors thereof: Fichte starts with Kant's Erfahrung, empirical cognition, and Schelling with the natural metaphysical need of human reason, the part of ordinary thought that is already recognizably philosophical.
Further differences flow from this. For both, scepticism is of vital importance for philosophy in general, and the recent sceptical attacks on Kant's philosophy are highly instructive, but there is an appreciable difference in what each makes of the sceptical challenge. For Fichte, following the pattern of Descartes' First Meditation, scepticism constitutes simply a challenge to the certainty accompanying our ordinary claims to knowledge of an objective world. Its immediate import is not to engender first-order doubt -in Fichte's Kantian eyes, Descartes fails to make the vertical ascent of reflection which defines the transcendental turn -but to impress on us the need for a vindicatory explanation of the possibility of objective experience, our doxastic commitment to which does not need to be revoked in order for philosophy to begin, since it has become its explanandum.
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If on the other hand philosophy begins with an inalienable possession -self-cognition of its idea -then it also begins at a level above that at which the sceptic operates, neither needing the provocation of scepticism nor fearing anything from it, and as such is already in a position to make use of scepticism. Schelling's take on scepticism is consequently much closer to Spinoza's: in the instant that we absorb the full force of radical sceptical doubt, we also and thereby recognize the existence of a ground of knowledge -the indeterminately conceived non-objectual unconditioned, heterogeneous with all objects of knowledge and known in an utterly different way. In Spinoza's 7 Form-Schrift, 41 [I, 91] . 8 The attitude to scepticism described here is held aside in The Vocation of Man, which (exceptionally) follows the design of the Meditations. 4 image, the darkness that the sceptic seeks to cast over human knowledge merely reveals the light without which nothing could be put in the shadows. 9 What allows Schelling to treat scepticism in this unconventionally platonistic fashion -to interpret it as directly revealing the non-emptiness of Kant's idea of the unconditioned, thus as giving more than it threatened to take away -he owes to Jacobi. 10 The moral that Jacobi extracted from his consideration of Spinoza, developed in his David Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism (1787) , is that philosophical reflection demands, but discovers that it cannot supply, knowledge of the unconditioned, its ideas of which are empty; and this confession of inadequacy forces it to relinquish its authority and cede to immediate feeling, Glaube, as the true condition for all knowledge. Schelling takes Jacobi's argument but subverts his anti-intellectualist conclusion: what the discovery of the unconditioned shows is not that philosophy must dissolve its systematic ambition but that its forms of reflection must be of an appropriately innovative, non-ordinary kind.
Scepticism delivers this forward-looking result because it proves the insufficiency of chains of connection between conditioneds, i.e. causal and inferential relations, to sustain the realm which they collectively compose, and since this realm must subsist -every move we make in the web of the conditioned, including the sceptic's own inferences, shows it to do so -the unconditioned must have reality qua its ground. A contrast of epistemological strategies has emerged: Fichte's adheres to the binary subjectobject structure of cognition, while Schelling retains a third term, which underwrites ordinary cognition but is not exhausted by that role, hence not reducible to a 'transcendental condition';
Fichte holds to the unequivocally idealistic thesis of Kant's Fourth Paralogism -that all of the being with which (theoretical) philosophy is concerned must be treated exclusively in terms of its candidacy for being cognized -while residues of Leibniz are detectable in Schelling, who is drawn to the notion that structures within reality which obtain independently of our cognition provide its correct explanation. 13 These differences become lost from sight, however, as soon as, in the next step of their common argument, the I enters the picture as fulfilling the conditions laid down.
Schelling's second 'Fichtean' text, Of the I as Principle of Philosophy, or On the
Unconditional in Human Knowledge (Ich-Schrift), argues that properties of the I uncovered in Kant's account of transcendental apperception but not spelled out by Kant, equip it for the role of highest principle: unconditionability, pure unity, identity, reflexivity, self-realizability, equivalence of thought and being, and (most importantly) non-objectifiability. The line of thought is familiar from the Wissenschaftslehre, but there is a difference in the order of argumentation. As we have seen, Concerning the Concept extracts the unconditioned from the needs of cognition, whereas the Form-Schrift grants it a primordial independent existence. For Fichte, then, the necessity of the unconditioned designates a mere role which remains unoccupied until filled by the I, which is supplied (more clearly in the later Jena presentation than in the 1794-95 Wissenschaftslehre) by the intuited actuality of the philosopher's self-consciousness, wherewith ontological commitment begins. The Form-Schrift argues quite differently: Because the unconditioned is self-realizing, it must posit itself, and as self-positing, it must be 'I', absolute I. 14 Schelling's argument raises a question, with repercussions which will emerge. It is not fully obvious that the self-positing unconditioned should be identified as an I, however much it fits the 13 Schelling thinks that something must be salvaged from the 'middle way' of the 'preformation system' described (and we are concerned with the absolute I only so far as it provides the moment of identity in selfconsciousness, and whatever it might be apart from that (if indeed that supposition has meaning) is irrelevant. 15 This answer is effective so long as no competing designation -no other angle, independent from the I, from which the absolute ground of its self-identity might be conceived -is in the offing, and in the Form-Schrift and Ich-Schrift, where no wedge is driven between I-hood and the reflexivity of the absolute, it is endorsed implicitly by Schelling.
II Gradual divergence and eventual opposition, 1795-1802
But it is retracted as soon as who of course accepts that this enquiry is legitimate, but whose discussions of natural science are relatively schematic and stick close to Kant. 21 Schelling's new agenda is in fact, however, profoundly radical, for his central claim is that the results of natural scientific enquiry -when liberated from empiricism -show Nature to be infinite productive activity. The activity is Nature's own -it constitutes natura naturans -not the I's act of positing. In ascribing to natural science a metaphysical significance independent of transcendental sources, Schelling grants the a posteriori privileges which Kant and Fichte reserve for the a priori: his claim is that natural science and speculative metaphysics can be joined in a spekulative Physik yielding cognitions of Nature which do not derive from Kantian principles of experience or Fichtean self-consciousness but which nonetheless share the necessity of the a priori. And since the ground of these cognitions is not subjective, they afford knowledge of Nature as something which is, like Kant's thing in itself, 'actual for itself'. Naturphilosophie opens up the possibility that the Wissenschaftslehre might be supplanted or superseded. All that is required, it would seem, is for some account to be given of the genesis of the individual finite I within Nature; a system of philosophy constructed around Naturphilosophie might then be held to answer the same questions, and to satisfy the same formal requirements, as the Wissenschaftslehre, while doing less violence to common-sense realism. Schelling is certainly tempted by this option, and goes so far as to assert the priority of Naturphilosophie over idealism, 27 but decides against it. The final eclipsing of Fichtean idealism is the work of the Identity
Philosophy that Schelling presents in 1801, and it is not a direct development of Naturphilosophie of the sort just described. To simply substitute Nature for the I would be to identify the absolute with a single conceptual form, and hence to reproduce, by a simple reversal, the structure of Fichte's system, thereby failing to grasp what Schelling now understands, more clearly than before, as the essentially indifferent character of the absolute, its transcendence of both subjectivity and objectivity. If to fix the absolute is to make it determinate and thus to destroy it, the problem is now to find some way of articulating it in a system. Schelling's initial solution, in 
III Being and knowing, and Is and Ought
Aside from its historical importance, the opposition of 
41
This contrast goes right back to the beginning. One pervasive theme in all three of the early 'Fichtean' texts discussed above, we saw, is Schelling's explicit ontological commitment: at every relevant point, Schelling emphasizes that the unconditioned, though we talk of it as 'posited', 'postulated' and so forth, as if its reality were still undecided, must be not merely thought as having being, but must have being; indeed Schelling adopts the key Spinozistic locution, saying that the unconditioned must be thinkable through its being. 42 Of particular interest to Schelling in those essays is the traditional ontological argument, which he rejects as an argument purporting to move from a concept to an object by way of pure inference, and interprets as groping towards the important truth that the unconditioned is realized through itself (it misrepresents this truth in the form of, so to speak, an 'argument' composing God's own cogito). 43 Fichte's Jena texts, on the whole, downplay ontological idioms, and in places Fichte entertains the notion that the Wissenschaftslehre might be some sort of fiction or mere 'model' of mental acts, validated by its results -its derivation and validation of the facts of experience as we know them -and not in need of truth in any more realistic, correspondence-style sense. There are in addition striking passages where Fichte draws a sharp distinction between 'activity', which defines thought and intuition, and 'being', which defines its objects. On the one hand it would seem that it must do so, because it corresponds to an essential component of the 'one-in-many' of self-consciousness: it is what supplies the pole of identity which unifies its 'many', the subject-I and object-I of the I as an Intelligenz, and since the reality of self-40 Ibid. 'formal correctness' of the Wissenschaftslehre, though not its content. 49 This formal correctness consists in the parallelism of Is and Ought which provides its overarching structure: the absolute I that has being at one end is the absolute I that ought to have being at the other. Fichte has therefore incorporated, albeit in a different way from Schelling, the insight of § §76-77 that, for an intuitive intellect, Is and Ought co-refer. It is this, furthermore, that dissolves the seeming contradiction in the Wissenschaftslehre concerning the existence of the absolute I, and demonstrates its coherence: the unconditioned 'X' which is needed to render absolute Kant's philosophy absolute can be determined both as posited absolutely by theoretical reason and as an idea to be realized by practical reason, and as both 'absolute' and 'I', because § §76-77 license us to overlay these distinct conceptions at the extreme limit of philosophical reflection, placing them at the beginning and the end-point of our Wissenschaft. To the extent that this structure invokes something akin to an indifference point, it is one validated by intuition. complaint that Fichte fails to sublate the subject-object opposition, and that his choice of (idealist) subjectivity over ('dogmatic') objectivity remains ultimately arbitrary, results from their failure to recognize the way in which the Wissenschaftslehre subordinates the subject-object polarity to that of Is-Ought. In fact there is nothing more to the intuitive intellect than the arc of thought that spans the separation of Is and Ought and prescribes our movement from the former to the latter:
Schelling's claim to occupy its standpoint rests on a misreading of § §76-77, which expands the selfunderstanding of the finite intellect, but does not license its self-assimilation to an infinite intellecta move which, if it comes to appear necessary, does so only because practical reason has been denied its proper role. 51 Such, in brief reconstruction, is Fichte's reply to Schelling. to lose confidence in, indeed to turn against, the assumption -vital for his critique of Fichte -that being, identity and ground are fundamentally transparent notions that can be employed to define a subjectivity-transcending standpoint. This does not of course lead Schelling to reopen the case against the Wissenschaftslehre, but Fichte would be right to ask why he does not -especially when it is noted how close to sheer paradox Schelling appears to come in his philosophical writings after 1815. In his very late Grounding of Positive Philosophy (1842-43), Schelling writes:
We can produce everything that occurs in our experience a priori in mere thought, but as such it exists, of course, only in thought. If we wanted to transform this into an objective proposition -say, that everything in itself likewise exists only in thought, then we would have to return to the standpoint of a Fichtean idealism. If we want anything that exists outside of thought, then we must proceed from a being that is absolutely independent of all thought, which precedes all thought.
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The retort available to Fichte is clear: If the only way to avoid Fichtean idealism is to 'proceed from' a being that is absolutely independent from and precedes all thought, then the Wissenschaftslehre has all the proof it could ever need, for we cannot take as our starting point a place that we cannot even conceive of occupying. 
